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Abstract
Natural languages with their speech communities tend to compete for speakers, very much
like firms compete for market shares. As a result, some languages suffer a shifting pressure
which might lead them to their extinction. This work studies the dynamics of language shift
in the context of modern bilingual societies like the Basque Country, Ireland and Wales.
They all have two official languages, linguistically distant: A, spoken by all, and B, spoken by
a bilingual minority. They also have a bilingual education system that ensures a steady flow
of new bilinguals. However, a decay in the use of B is observed, signalling that shift pro-
cesses are at work. To investigate this apparent paradox, we use a novel approach in the lit-
erature of language competition. We build a behavioural game model with which bilinguals
choose either language A or B for each interaction. Thus, they play repeatedly the game.
We present a theorem predicting that under reasonable assumptions, any given population
of bilinguals will converge into a linguistic convention, namely into an evolutionary stable
equilibrium of the game, that always embeds a proportion of bilinguals shifting to A. We vali-
date this result by means of an empirical version of the model, showing that the predictions
fit well the observed data of street use of Basque and daily use of Irish and Welsh.
Introduction
In societies with two languages, a majoritarian one A, and a minoritarian one B, the process of
abandoning the use of B in favour of A is called minority language shift. Due to its importance
for the cultural diversity, this is a widely studied topic by sociolinguists (e.g., [1–3]), and more
recently also by physicists and mathematicians. To our knowledge, the first formal model of
language shift is the influential work of [4] (some extensions of that model are [5–7]; see also
the survey of [8] and the references therein). Reaction-diffusion models have also been pro-
posed to study the dynamics of language shift over time and space; see [9–11]. Further, [12]
observe that none of the formal models provides information on local changes in language use.
Hence, they propose a microscopic scale model that can follow successfully the changes in lan-
guage use on a detailed spatial scale.
PLOS ONE







Citation: Uriarte JR, Sperlich S (2021) A
behavioural model of minority language shift:
Theory and empirical evidence. PLoS ONE 16(6):
e0252453. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0252453
Editor: Boyu Zhang, Beijing Normal University,
CHINA
Received: January 8, 2021
Accepted: May 16, 2021
Published: June 4, 2021
Peer Review History: PLOS recognizes the
benefits of transparency in the peer review
process; therefore, we enable the publication of
all of the content of peer review and author
responses alongside final, published articles. The
editorial history of this article is available here:
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0252453
Copyright: © 2021 Uriarte, Sperlich. This is an
open access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
within the manuscript and its Supporting
information files.
Funding: J.R. Uriarte acknowledges financial
support from the Basque Government and the
However, while some of these formal models may fit well the data, they explain less well
why bilingual individuals behave one way or the other. The reason is that no adaptive deci-
sion-makers nor behavioural assumptions are introduced in those models. Instead, linguistic
interactions are modelled for instance as a Gaussian function, c.f. [12] who consider a model
of physical diffusion. Along this line, there are models that describe language competition and
shift as travelling waves and wave fronts (e.g., [10, 11]). Although the inspiration for modelling
based on physics is legitimate, the problem is that since bilingual individuals are not described
as decision makers, language shift cannot be observed as the outcome of their language choice
behaviour. Therefore, the introduction of behavioural assumptions to understand minority
language shift remains a challenge. To complement the literature on formal models of lan-
guage shift, our approach is to start with a theoretical behavioural model, and then counter-
check it with observational data.
We will adopt the Council of Europe’s view ([13]) that one should look at the bilinguals’
language use behaviour, and concentrate our study on three European, contemporary, modern
bilingual societies: the Basque Country, Ireland and Wales. They all have two official lan-
guages, linguistically distant, the majoritarian A, and the minoritarian B. The chance of speak-
ing B in these advanced bilingual societies is sensitive to the forces of modernization. In
particular, the mobility, both social and geographical, of the work force (composed of bilingual
and monolingual individuals) and the growing of metropolitan cities shape anonymous inter-
actions, which means that people’s linguistic type (bilingual or monolingual) becomes private
information. Further, since bilinguals and monolinguals live in the same areas and have jobs
in the same workplaces, language contact between A and B ([14, 15]) is now tighter than in
past periods. New laws and abundant resources are used in those societies in favour of lan-
guage B. Political changes were made that led to the recognition of their minority languages as
official ones: the Law of Normalization of Basque’s Use of 1982; the Welsh Language Measure
of 2011; and the recognition by the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland in 1937 that Irish is
the first official language. Hence, to the bilingual speakers of these societies, the A and B lan-
guages have the same perceived value or status. Therefore, the minority language prestige,
which is considered to be a relevant parameter for [4], becomes meaningless to understand
language shift in the societies under consideration. As in all modern societies, the main trans-
mission channel of society’s cultural traits is the educational system, where pupils receive a
bilingual education in the two official languages; see [16–18]. Thus, a continuous flow of
potentially bilingual individuals is guaranteed. However, the data of Basque, Irish and Welsh
show that despite the existing proportions of bilinguals, the use of these languages is lagging
behind. This apparent paradox signals that language shift processes are at work.
The societies under study have the following three relevant features: the languages A and B
are linguistically distant. There are no geographical or any other type of barriers between bilin-
guals and monolinguals (i.e. monolinguals are those who only speak A, and, due to language
distance, do not understand B); that is, bilinguals and monolinguals are in close contact. Fur-
thermore, people’s linguistic type is private information. Under these conditions, the language
decisions taken by bilinguals have an interactive nature. That is, since the chosen language will
serve the purpose of communication in interactions where bilinguals and monolinguals might
meet, the choice of B made by a bilingual might not be the actual language that will be used in
the interaction. Note that this type of interactive decisions hardly occurs in a monolingual
society, i.e. a society where only one language is spoken. Game theory and, in particular our
proposed game which we call the Language Use Game model (LUG, henceforth), is a natural
framework to study interactive language decisions, allowing us to introduce behavioural
assumptions. In our model, bilingual individuals choose the language for each interaction
through the play of such LUG. A bilingual would choose B when she plays the strategy Reveal
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that you are bilingual. The bilingual will choose language A when she plays the strategy Hide
that you are bilingual. Since monolinguals do not choose language, the LUG is a game played
only by the (sub)population of bilinguals. Further, since there is uncertainty about the linguis-
tic type of the interactive partners, we assume that the LUG is a game played under imperfect
information. To overcome this imperfection, a bilingual who chooses the strategy Reveal is
informing about her bilingual nature to the interactive partner, so that B will be used if both
happened to be bilingual. Then they will get a higher utility for using their preferred language
B. But a Reveal player may suffer a utility loss when she is forced to switch to A when the inter-
active partner happens to be monolingual. However, when a bilingual chooses the strategy
Hide she is reinforcing the imperfect information, making the use of B less likely. In game-the-
oretic terminology, one could say that we model this repeated play of the LUG by means of a
so-called replicator dynamics equation (RD). This RD is derived for social contexts from imi-
tation and trial-and-error-learning processes, i.e. in our case the players repeatedly play the
LUG replicating their Reveal / Hide strategy (see also further below). Accordingly, the RD
model is the right framework, though the presentation of our model below can also be fol-
lowed without knowing RD; you may consult [19, 20] for details. Since we want to trace down
the local (i.e. municipal) changes in the use of B, we assume that the LUG is played at every
municipality quoted in the sociolinguistic surveys. These are periodically made to know the
state of B (either Basque, Irish or Welsh). To understand the language shift occurring at a local
level, we seek to predict the use of B associated to the municipal population of bilinguals
observed in the specific year of each survey.
We present a theorem saying that under some reasonable assumptions, any given municipal
population of bilinguals will converge into a linguistic convention that always embeds a pro-
portion of bilinguals shifting to A. In other words, the repeated play of the LUG makes any
population of bilinguals converge into an equilibrium that has the nature of a linguistic con-
vention. This convention takes the form of a partition of the population in two groups: those
who play Reveal and those who play Hide. Members of the former group speak in B with any
other bilingual. But when Hide players meet, then they will use language A. In terms of lan-
guage dynamics, we show that the linguistic conventions have strong stability properties. To
empirically validate this theoretical finding, we build a statistical version of the model, and
show that the equilibrium predictions fit well the observed local changes in the street use of
Basque, and daily use of Irish and Welsh, respectively. We conclude that our model is empiri-
cally valid to understand minority language shift dynamics in the considered modern bilingual
societies. How would previous formal models of language shift dynamics (quoted above) per-
form in the bilingual societies considered here? They may break down when they do not han-
dle the imperfect information of bilingual types, with bilinguals having difficulties to recognize
each other. Further, since bilinguals and monolinguals form tight mixed populations across
the country, there are no speech communities of A segmented geographically or economically
from the speech communities of B. Accordingly, reaction-diffusion models are not appropriate
for the societies under consideration. Therefore we see our contribution as a complement to
the literature on formal models of language shift. Finally, our model gives a (probably partial)
view of the formal issues one should look at to tackle Fishman’s question “Why is it so hard to
save a threatened language” [1].
Materials and methods
Benchmark bilingual societies
We consider economically advanced bilingual societies having two official languages, A and B,
linguistically distant in the spirit of [21]. We assume that there are essentially two linguistic
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groups: the monolingual speakers, who speak only A, and a minority of bilingual speakers who
speak A and B with similar skills. Let α 2 (0, 1) denote the proportion of bilingual speakers
over the total population of the specific society, and 1 − α the proportion of monolinguals, see
Table 1. We do not take into account the boundary numbers 0 and 1, which are hardly
observed in the data used in the present work anyway. The first assumption is the following:
A.1. Languages and Speakers: The languages with official status, A and B, are linguistically
distant so that successful communication is only possible in a single language, either A or B. Fur-
ther, the proportion of bilinguals in the total population of the country is smaller than the propor-
tion of monolinguals: α< 1 − α, α 2 (0, 1).
Passive bilinguals, i.e. those who understand B but cannot speak it, are not considered (or
can be treated as monolinguals as discussed in the S1 Appendix. When a monolingual interacts
with a bilingual, they necessarily use A. Hence, B is spoken only when two bilinguals meet, and
at least one of them signals the desire to speak in B. Therefore, language choice is not trivial.
Some examples of societies satisfying A.1 are the Basque Country, Ireland and Wales. Bas-
que is a pre-indoeuropean language, spoken in the Autonomous Community of Euskadi
(ACE) (Spain), Navarre (Spain) and in the Pays Basque (France). It is in contact with the two
Romance languages, Spanish (Castellano) and French. Irish and Welsh, two Celtic languages,
are in contact with the Germanic language English. These are competitive bilingual societies,
both in the economic and the linguistic domain, with sufficient resources to implement well
articulated language policies to protect and transmit B, mainly through the educational system.
They are a kind of benchmark in the set of societies with threatened languages satisfying A.1.
If minority languages are shifted here, this will be even more so in the less developed multilin-
gual societies contemplated in [1]. Note that because of A.1 our model may not apply to study
the issues of closely related languages, such as Catalan and Castellano. The use of a minority
language can be measured in different ways. For instance, since 2006, the Census of Population
in Ireland contains a questionnaire about the ability to speak Irish for aged three and over, and
the frequency of use (daily, weekly, less often, never) outside the Education system. The Cen-
sus of Wales contains a similar questionnaire with respect to Welsh. In Wales, two language
use surveys were carried out covering the periods 2004–06 and 2013–15, with a self-comple-
tion questionnaire to be returned by post. The information gathered from those sources serve
to estimate the daily use (DU) of Irish and Welsh (data sources for Irish and Welsh are in S1
Appendix). A quite different procedure is followed to measure the street use of Basque -kale
erabilera in Basque (KE). Field surveyors collect random observations in the streets and public
places of municipalities where Basque is spoken, by listening and recording the language of
conversation between the observed subjects. The information gathering procedure is
Table 1. Evolution of percentages of bilinguals (α), street use (KE) and daily use (DU).
Basque Irish Welsh
Year α KE Year α DU Year α DU
1993 22.3 11.8
1996 24.4 13.0 1996 41.1 10.16
2001 25.4 13.3 2002 41.9 09.05
2006 25.7 13.7 2006 40.8 02.10 2005 20.8 13.0
2011 27.0 13.2 2011 40.6 02.13
2016 28.4 12.6 2014 19.0 13.0
These percentages were not always measured in the same year; and surveys were executed over longer periods. The indicated year refers to the mid-term.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0252453.t001
PLOS ONE A behavioural model of minority language shift
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0252453 June 4, 2021 4 / 17
anonymous since there is no contact between surveyors and observed subjects, neither before
nor after the recording. For more details, see S1 Appendix.
In Table 1 are shown the aggregates obtained in the mentioned surveys. They show the pro-
portion of bilinguals, α, the street use of Basque, KE, and the daily use of Irish and Welsh, DU,
in different years. However, for the empirical study, we will use the data on the disaggregated
level, namely municipality and local authority level, as they exhibit the joint variation of αi and
language use, KEi and DUi (i denoting a municipality or local authority). This is extremely
important because in our context, aggregated data can be quite misleading. Take the following
example of looking at only two localities (denoted 1 and 2), a small one with α1 = 0.8 and KE1
= 0.5, and a five times larger locality with α2 = 0.2 and KE2 = 0.02. For their aggregates we get α
= 0.3 with KE = 0.1. Now, supposing that all conversations were the result of a random match
(people match independently of their language skills), if bilinguals communicated among
themselves always in B, we had KE1 ¼ a21 ¼ 0:64 and KE2 ¼ a
2
2
¼ 0:04; i.e., in each locality
there would be a much more frequent street use of B than the observed ones such that one
could conclude a language shift. In contrast, if only looking at the aggregates, we could expect
at most KE = α2 = 0.09 which is even less than observed. Consequently, the aggregates would
insinuate a frequent use of B, whereas the disaggregated data could reveal a language shift.
Remark 1: The sources of data to elaborate the linguistic surveys of these three languages
are the localities: municipalities for Basque, and local authorities for Irish and Welsh. Our
model will be applied on those local data. Access to all the data used in the present work is free,
see S1 Appendix.
An example: The rules of the road game
Before we continue, the following example will provide you with an intuitive idea of the
notions of (strict) Nash equilibrium and Evolutionary Stable Strategy Equilibrium as an
emerging Convention, terminology used in the next section. Let us consider the game of
which side of the road to drive on, whether left side or right side [22]. The game is played by
two oncoming vehicles. Since drivers want to avoid accidents, they will coordinate regarding
the side of the road (i.e. a coordination game). Drivers have no incentives to deviate from coor-
dinating on the same side because they are strictly better off than being involved in an acci-
dent. This is the basis for the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. Hence, this coordination game
has two strict Nash equilibria: both on their left side (L,L) or both on their right (R,R) side.
These equilibria are two conventions. But which of the two equilibria will be chosen? This is
the same as asking which of the two conventions, (L,L) or (R,R), will be adopted by the society?
To answer this question, we should view how the game evolves historically by the repetition of
the interaction. We can think of the game being played by a large population. Each time a dif-
ferent pair of drivers will play the game and may remember how the interaction was solved. As
the game is repeated over and over by many people, one particular way of solving the interac-
tions, say (R,R), takes prominence in the population, driving out the other one, (L,L). This pro-
cess of emerging the convention is by accumulation of precedents (in the game theory
literature one often speaks of ‘imitation’). In our view, this mechanism might explain how a
linguistic convention is built by the bilinguals. A convention may become established through
a different mechanism. Initially, when traffic was scarce, some area of the country might
adopt, by local custom, say, the (L,L) convention, while other areas of the country adopt the
(R,R) convention. As traffic grew, the evolution of those conventions became affected by sud-
den changes in the law that regulated the traffic. Finally, the society decided politically to estab-
lish one convention. Note that in terms of welfare, both conventions are equally good. What
the established convention does is to solve the indeterminacy. That is, we may define a
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convention that has emerged historically as an equilibrium that everybody expects in interac-
tions (i.e. expectations and behaviour are finally in an equilibrium). This could also have more
than one equilibrium, as in the road game. Such a convention that has emerged and been
adopted by the society, is called an Evolutionary Stable Strategy Equilibrium of the game. For
our Language Use Game below, it can be shown (see S1 Appendix) that bilinguals converge
into an equilibrium in which they do not all play a strategy that would maximize the use of B.
The language use game
We assume that this the LUG is played in every locality of the country where B is spoken. For
each year of the linguistic survey of B, a locality i is characterized by the reported number of
bilingual speakers, Ni, the proportion of bilinguals with respect to the total population of i, αi,
and the reported local street use of Basque, KEi, or the local daily use of Irish and Welsh, DUi,
respectively. To simplify notation, we do not use indices to refer to each of the three languages
since the base model is the same for all languages and localities. We use the linguistic surveys
to understand how a decrease in the use of B ca be explained albeit there is an education system
ensuring a continuous flow of new speakers of B. We proceed as follows. We choose the year
of the survey of one of the considered B languages, and take as given the reported αi of locality
i. Then we seek to predict with the LUG model the use of B in locality i for that year. We use
the same procedure for every locality reported in the survey. Thus, for the chosen year we
obtain a function that relates each reported αi with its corresponding predicted use of B. Then
we compare the predictions with the actual data of B use in that year. We proceed in the same
manner for every linguistic year of each of the three B languages. Notice that ‘predicted by’ or
‘expected along’ our model can be used synonymously in this context. A detailed description
and derivation of the LUG can be found in S1 Appendix. Here we concentrate on the main
ideas, starting with the assumptions.
A feature of modern societies is the mobility, both social and geographical, of the work
force, and the growing of metropolitan cities. The spread of bilinguals in those urban contexts
implies that often they interact without perfect knowledge about the others’ language skills and
preferences.
A.2. Linguistic Imperfect Information: Let i be any locality of a country where one of the men-
tioned B languages is spoken. We assume that the linguistic type (bilingual or monolingual) of
individuals interacting in i is private information. We also assume that bilinguals, both from i
and from elsewhere in the country know the proportion αi reported in the linguistic surveys.
We may assume, at least for bilinguals, common knowledge about the proportions of bilin-
guals, αi, because when the linguistic surveys are published, their content is discussed in the
media, commented by the concerned people, and politically debated. As it is common when
one is testing empirically a theory, we must adapt A.2 to the reality of actual conversations (see
below the statistical version of the model). We can think that each bilingual individual is
adapted to the sociolinguistic context of her locality i, where language B is known and used by
a percentage of the population. That linguistic landscape will shape a specific adaptation level
or reference point for the bilingual inhabitants of i (as it happens with non-sensory attributes,
such as wealth or health, and with sensory ones, such as temperature) cf. [23]. Thus, the local-
ity where the bilingual inhabits becomes her linguistic reference point. It is natural to assume
that the bilinguals have the aspiration of B becoming a non-endangered language. Beyond
that, however, they know B will not reach language A’s full normalization state. We can think
that there is an increasing and concave (but almost flat) aspiration function S that assigns to
each αi the aspiration proportion a�i , which the bilinguals from i think it would make B a non-
endangered language, fulfilling ai < a
�
i < 1. Given the flat curvature of S, all aspirations are
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grouped into a similarity interval [24]. That is, for all i, a�i has no perceptible differences with
the country’s aspiration set by the linguistic authority, denoted α�. Therefore we will use α�
instead of a�i , fulfilling a
�
i < a
� < 1 for all i. Notice that in a choice situation, the aspiration rep-
resents the most desired alternative, available or not. However, it is well known, experimentally
and theoretically, that unavailable choices have an important influence on the decision behav-
iour of agents, known as the aspiration effect [25].
The payoffs in terms of ‘experienced utilities’ are assumed to represent net communication
benefits ([26–28]). Let m(αi) be the payoff that a bilingual gets when interacting in language B
at locality i. Let n − c(αi)>0 be the payoff to a bilingual in locality i who, having decided to use
B, is matched to a monolingual but due to A.1 is forced to switch to A. Thus, c(αi) is the bilin-
gual’s frustration cost. Since information is imperfect (A.2), a bilingual may choose voluntarily
language A, obtaining n> 0. This n is also the payoff for monolinguals from using the majority
language A. Therefore, n is a constant. We make the following assumptions:
A.3. Aspirations, Linguistic Preferences and Payoffs: Let us consider the set of all localities i
where one of the mentioned B languages is spoken, and the set of proportions of speakers of B of
each locality, αi, reported in the linguistic survey of a given year. The payoff function for speaking
B and the frustration cost for being forced to switch, m(αi) and c(αi), satisfy the following
properties:
• m(αi) and c(αi) are strictly decreasing functions in αi 2 (0, α�), approaching n and zero, respec-
tively, as αi approaches the country’s aspiration level α�.





Note that m(αi)>n shows that the preference intensity for using B decreases as αi increases
(i.e., when we observe localities with higher proportion of bilinguals).
Remark 2: The existence of a bilingual educational system produces a continuous flow of
potential bilinguals that changes the αi. Due to mobility, the increase can be quite unequal
over the localities. Those changes are mainly due to factors outside the model, related to politi-
cal attitudes, cultural identity, and the commitment of transmitting B to future generations.
This means that the argument of communicative benefits [27] as a driving force to invest in
the learning of a language, hardly applies here.
The LUG is a game in strategic form because the purpose is to investigate bilinguals’ inter-
active language choices. If we were to model a conversation, then it would be better described
by a so-called extensive form game; see [29]. Specifically, imagine how the game is played at
any locality i (where either Basque, Irish or Welsh is spoken) endowed with a proportion αi 2
(0, α�) in a given year. We assume that bilinguals choose the language at the beginning of an
interaction, under the assumptions A.1-A.3. They do it by choosing one of the following pure
strategies of language use:
R: Reveal always that you are bilingual, so that you will speak B whenever you meet a
bilingual.
H: Hide that you are bilingual, and reveal it only when matched with an R-player. That is,
speak A, and switch to B only when you are addressed in B.
When an R player meets a bilingual, their common (bilingual) trait is revealed, and lan-
guage B will be used. In this event, both bilinguals get the maximum payoff m(αi). In the event
of meeting a monolingual, by assumption A.1 the R player is forced to switch to A and obtains
n − c(αi). However, a monolingual might feel uncomfortable when meeting an R player and
being forced to confess her ignorance of B. The H player avoids that discomfort by choosing A
as speaker (the interactant who starts the conversation). As a respondent, she answers in the
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language used by the speaker, either A or B. This way the H player avoids the cost c(αi) but gets
m(αi) (only) when matched with an R player. The essence of H is that she reinforces the imper-
fect information A.2, behaving as a monolingual in disguise, unless she is discovered by an R
player. Clearly, H is less effort demanding than R. Note that neither the mentioned strategies
nor being speaker or respondent are conditioned by a specific player position (row or column)
in the LUG. The pure strategies of the LUG describe two frequent behaviours observed in
minority bilingual populations. The inspiration for R is the militant of the minority language
(for the militants of Basque, who are gathered in Euskaraldia, and those of Welsh, mostly gath-
ered in the Welsh Language Society, see S1 Appendix). Whereas H represents a more conven-
tional behaviour, who tend to think it is not polite to address in B to unknown interlocutors,
and easily falling into language shift The LUG, described in Fig 1, is a game played, at each
locality i, only by bilinguals since monolinguals do not choose language. There are two states
of nature: two bilinguals meet (Bilingual), or a bilingual meets a monolingual (Monolingual).
At the start of the interaction, the bilingual, by A.2, is uncertain about the state, but expects to
meet another bilingual with probability αi, and expects to meet a monolingual with probability
1 − αi. When the Bilingual state is realized, depending on the pair of strategies, either language
A or B is spoken and a pair of payoffs is obtained. When the Monolingual state is realized, the
bilingual will speak A, and get n − c(αi) if R is chosen, or payoff n> 0 if H is chosen. Hence,
strategy (i.e. language) choices are made according to expected payoffs. The matrix of expected
payoffs is given in Figure, see also S1 Appendix.
Assumptions A.1 and A.2 capture the conditions under which bilinguals must make their
language choices. Given those constraints, bilinguals are led to make frequent language choices
to satisfy their linguistic preferences (A.3). Hence, we assume that the LUG is played continu-
ously over time, at each locality i, by the local bilingual population Ni. Now consider a given
survey year. As noted above, we seek to predict the use of B in each locality i, given its propor-
tion αi. Hence, we may imagine that in every locality i, pairs of individuals from this locality
are repeatedly drawn at random to play the LUG. We assume that the resulting language use
population dynamics is modelled by the standard replicator dynamics (RD) attached to the
LUG (S1 Appendix). The replicators are the pure strategies R and H. In the standard RD set-
ting, there is at any time t a language use population state, (pi(t), 1 − pi(t)), where pi(t) = NiR(t)/
Ni represents the fraction of bilinguals of locality i who play pure strategy R at time t, and 1 −
pi(t) the fraction of those who play H at t (we will abbreviate pi(t) to pi in what follows). Since
we have a population of bilinguals who can play only two pure strategies, the RD consists of a
single ordinary differential equation that describes the growth rate of pi (the growth rate of the
fraction who plays H will move in the opposite direction; adding up both growth rates must
always be equal to 1). The next result makes a theoretical prediction about the use of language
Fig 1. The language use game. The matrix on the left describes the state where two bilinguals meet. The combination of pairs of strategies, R and H,
gives rise to cells where a pair of payoffs and the resulting language are shown. The column on the right describes the state where a Bilingual meets a
Monolingual. The spoken language will be A, and the payoff to the bilingual depends on the strategy chosen.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0252453.g001
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B, in a randomly chosen locality i. We make the mild assumption that at the starting point of
the replicator equation, there are some bilinguals playing R; that is, pi 2 (0, 1) at t = 0. The the-
orem shows that under the assumptions A.1-A.3, any given local population of bilinguals
involved in a continuous play of the LUG will converge into a linguistic convention that will
always contain a proportion of that population shifting to language A. Remark 3, below,
describes the convention in terms of the strategic context of the LUG.
Theorem 1 Let B denote any of the minority languages under consideration, and i a ran-
domly chosen locality in which the linguistic survey (of the year under scrutiny) reports a propor-
tion of speakers of B, αi 2 (0, α�). Then under the assumptions A.1-A.3, and pi 2 (0, 1) at t = 0:
(a) The ESS equilibrium: given the observed αi, the replicator dynamics (i.e., the language use
population dynamics) converges into p�i 2 ð0; 1Þ, the unique Nash equilibrium which is an evolu-
tionary stable strategy (ESS) of the LUG played at i:
p�i ¼ p




aiðmðaiÞ   nÞ   ð1   aiÞcðaiÞ
aiðmðaiÞ   nÞ
ð1Þ
where n> 0 is a given constant. There are two additional rest points for the replicator equation,
0 and 1, both unstable. (b) Language B shift in equilibrium: if p�i ¼ p
�ðaiÞ is the ESS equilibrium
reached at i, then ð1   p�i Þð1   p
�
i Þ is the probability of a randommatching of two bilinguals
who play strategy H and use language A in the interaction; i.e., the probability of language shift




i ð1   p
�
i Þ þ ð1  
p�i Þp
�
i is the probability of all randommatches in which an R player participates and B is used at
locality i, for that year.
Proof: Part (a) We calculate first the LUG´s matrix of expected payoffs (see S1 Appendix)
and then we build the associated replicator dynamics equation, to obtain:
_pi ¼ pið1   piÞ½aiðmðaiÞ   nÞð1   piÞ   cðaiÞð1   aiÞ�
By A.3, p�i ¼ p
�ðaiÞ 2 ð0; 1Þ. From the replicator equation, it can be seen that p�i is a global
attractor in (0, 1), and that both 0 and 1 are unstable rest points (see S1 Appendix). Part (b) fol-
lows from the ESS equilibrium.
The ESS equilibrium function: Assume now that the LUG is played (under the same set of
assumptions of the Theorem) not just in one but in every locality i where the language B we
are dealing with is spoken. Then each locality’s language use population dynamics will con-
verge into an ESS in the interval (0, 1), as in the Theorem. We may, equivalently, say that the
ESS equilibrium of the Theorem, p�i ¼ p
�ðaiÞ, becomes a function, having as domain the set of
all local αi reported in the language survey of the year under consideration. Thus, we have the
following Corollary of the Theorem.
Corollary 1 (The language B shift equilibrium function): Using Eq (1), and under the
assumptions of the Theorem, we build a function p�(αi) as follows: To each value of αi 2 (0, α�),
reported in the survey of the year under consideration, p�(αi) will assign its corresponding local
ESS, p�i . Therefore, this function predicts, for each given αi, the language B shift of equilibrium at
locality i, for that year.
Remark 3: In social and economic contexts, an ESS equilibrium is thought of as a conven-
tion [30]. Thus, in the context of the LUG, each p�i is a linguistic convention that takes the
form of a partition of the bilingual population of each locality i, Ni, in two groups: Nip�i and
Nið1   p�i Þ. Members of the former group speak B with any other bilingual, and members of
the latter speak A between them. Like any other convention, it becomes a self-enforcing mech-
anism of language coordination, with the unintended consequence of a fraction of bilinguals
shifting to language A.
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The statistic predictive models of minority language use
The predictive models are based on the expected use of B in the ESS equilibrium (developed in
S1 Appendix). The predictive street use of Basque and the predictive daily use of Irish and
Welsh are modelled in different ways. We start with the latter since it is somewhat easier to
model. Let p�i ¼ p
�ðaiÞ be the corresponding ESS equilibrium reached in that locality (as
shown in the above Theorem).




for an unknown positive constant c0.
The reasoning behind this is that bilinguals who play strategy R will answer (in the language
survey or Census) that they use B every day, and that almost all who play strategy H will answer
that they do not use B every day. This suggests c0� 1, which, however, is not needed in our
study, see Eq (5) below.
For modelling the street use of B at locality i, it is natural to assume that, in the sample pop-
ulation, conversations in B occur both in random and non-random matches. Suppose we treat
all street conversations at i like random matches between two people. Then the chance of
observing the use of B would be the probability to record a militant (i.e., the prototype of an R
player of the LUG model, as mentioned above) matched with another bilingual, independently
of whether the latter is a militant or not. That probability, in the ESS equilibrium, would be:
ða2i p
�2




i ð1   p
�




i , where aip
�
i is the chance to observe a militant, and αi the chance
that the other person is bilingual. Thus, a2i p
�
i has to be multiplied by 2 because the order, (mili-
tant + bilingual) or (bilingual + militant), does not matter for the language use. But, then, since
the matches of two militants are counted twice, they have to be subtracted once. You get the
same formula by looking at all combinations via the binomial formula:
ða2i p
�2




i ð1   p
�









However, a street language use survey will get also the records of nonrandom matches,
which will, most likely, increase the observed use of B due to the linguistic preferences of bilin-
guals; in particular, the militants’ preferences. Moreover, militants, as minority language advo-
cates, are more likely (i.e., more frequently) to know or recognize each other, meet and talk.
This suggests that Eq (2) will experience two kind of changes caused by the non-random
matches. First, the percentage of conversations in B increases as a whole; and second, for the
above mentioned reasons, the fraction of matches with two militants involved will increase. All
this transforms Eq (2) into the following model:










with unknown constants c1 > 0, c2� 1.
Clearly, for c1 = c2 = 1 we have the same proportion as in the unrealistic situation of only
recording random matches. One may argue that c1� 1 assuming that the change is mainly
due to the increased matches of militants. For the same reason c2 is likely to be much smaller
than 1. We tried different values and found an excellent data fit for c2 = 0, which implies that
the fraction of matches between militants doubles, see Eq (4) below.
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Empirical specification
Notice that, given the year of the linguistic survey, PKE(αi) and PDU(αi) are both functions
that relate each locality’s αi with the predicted use of B in each locality’s ESS equilibrium. Now,
we look for the statistical versions of PKE(αi) and PDU(αi) to provide predictions of the LUG
model along the observed data of KEi and DUi. To this end, we first need to build the empirical
version of the equilibrium function p�i ¼ p
�ðaiÞ, by means of the empirical specification of the
functions entering into Eq (1) (for a detailed derivation of the empirical form see the S1
Appendix). Plugging all the specifications into Eq (1), we obtain
p�i ¼ p
�ðaiÞ ¼ b1ð1   aiÞða
b3
i   aiÞ
b2   1 : ð3Þ
Substituting the empirical version of p�(αi) in PKE(αi) and in PDU(αi), using c2 = 0, we get
the empirical predictive models of B use:
PKEðaiÞ ¼ 2c1b1a2i ð1   aiÞða
b3
i   aiÞ
b2   1 ¼ ~b1a
2
i ð1   aiÞða
b3
i   aiÞ
b2   1; ð4Þ
PDUðaiÞ ¼ c0b1aið1   aiÞða
b3
i   aiÞ
b2   1 ¼ �b1aið1   aiÞða
b3
i   aiÞ
b2   1; ð5Þ
We introduce here ~b1 ¼ 2c1b1 and �b1 ¼ c0b1 because β1 cannot be separately identified in
either of the models. Since we do not need to identify it for our study, we can use this simpli-
fied notation.
Remark 4: For each year of the linguistic survey, the empirical versions of PKE(αi) and
PDU(αi) have one observational variable, the αi of each locality, and three regression parame-
ters: β2, β3 and either ~b1 or �b1. The estimates of these parameters are presented in S1 Appendix.
For the model to make sense, we work with the restrictions ~b1,
�b1 > 0 and β3 2 (0, 1).
Empirical results
The presentation of results concentrates on the predictive functions. In Fig 2 the estimates of
the empirical equilibrium models, the functions PKE(αi) and PDU(αi), are summarized. The
individual estimates are depicted in S1 Appendix.
Not surprisingly, each empirical equilibrium model, PKE(αi) for Basque, and PDU(αi) for
Irish and Welsh, gives rise to an increasing and convex relation between αi, and the predicted
use of B in the ESS equilibrium at i. It could be argued that intuition might suggest that the
predictive functions should be increasing and convex. However, these two properties alone
cannot explain the variations observed in the data. There is still plenty of room for model mis-
specification. For this reason, we tested nonparametrically the model based estimates. We first
calculated nonparametric regression functions for all years and languages, and then con-
structed 90% confidence bands for our model-based estimates using bootstrap. Details are
given in S1 Appendix, together with all the resulting figures. All model-based estimates come
very close to the nonparametric data fits. Moreover, most of the time the confidence bands
include the nonparametric fit. This supports empirically our theory, and therefore, the LUG
model. Indeed, other theory models could be constructed leading to similar results. This, how-
ever, is in the nature of empirical analysis and holds for all empirical studies.
Let us look at the development of αi, KEi and DUi over time. The box-plots (left panel) in
Fig 2 illustrate the development of the distributions over the years. Recall that we are looking
at all combinations (αti, KEti) and (αti, DUti), without weighting them by the population size of
municipality i. We see that all years exhibit a huge dispersion for αi and KEi (less so for DUi)
with no stabilization of the distributions of these indicators. The panel on the right of Fig 2
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shows the development of PKE(αi) and PDU(αi) over time. The tendency for Irish (ys 2002,
2006, 2011) is clear: its use went down dramatically, already starting from a low level. The
PDU(αi) captures the drop of Irish use between 2002 and 2006 (see Table 1). That fall could be
due to the fact that only since 2006 the daily use of Irish was clearly defined as used outside the
education system. Basque and Welsh have a more intensive use than Irish. For Welsh we have
two observations in time, contained in the surveys WLUS 2004–06 and 2013–15 about the use
of Welsh. Thus, we show two PDU(αi) that show no significant changes, capturing the stability
observed in the WLUS data for that decade (yet, see the discrepancies between the Censuses
and the WLUS surveys in S1 Appendix). The Basque language follows a more intriguing path
Fig 2. Development of α and use of Basque (upper panel), Irish (centre) and Welsh (lower panel) over time. For each year,
PKE(αi) associates to each local αi the predicted local street use of Basque in equilibrium; and so does the PDU(αi) for Irish and
Welsh. On the left we see box-plots showing the development of α (white) and KE, respectively DU distributions (grey) over
years.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0252453.g002
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(than Irish and Welsh). The data for Basque covering the period from 1993 to 2016 show that
the number of municipalities with small αi and/or small values of KEi has diminished. This
might explain the bilinguals’ aspirations, and why they feel that the country’s proportion of
bilinguals, α, has to increase much more to become a non-endangered and almost normalized
language (β3 is converging to zero from above; as in Wales, but less so in Ireland; see S1
Appendix. We first briefly comment on some observed changes in the data, and then show
how the model captures and explains those changes. Consider municipalities with a small per-
centage of bilinguals (αi< 20%) such as those that compose the metropolitan area of Bilbao
(35 municipalities and 1,037,847 inhabitants, almost half of the total population of the Basque
Autonomous Community in 2016). The changes of αi in those localities reached its maximum
in 2011, and remain at a similar level for the next years. KEi, increased too, with some munici-
palities reaching its maximum in 2001, others in 2006 or 2011. Once the maximum is reached,
essentially all municipalities show a decrease of the KEi in the following years. Thus, in some
localities, the increase in αi coincides with a decrease in KEi, like in Bilbao, where αi starts at
9.63% in 1997 and reaches a maximum of 24.30% in 2011. Whereas KEi starts at 4.52% in 1997
and goes down to 2.5% in 2016. Consider now municipalities where the majority of the popu-
lation is bilingual, say, with αi� 60%, like those in the coast of the province of Biscay. There,
roughly speaking, the percentage of bilinguals is kept constant during the period 1993–2016.
At the same time, again the KEi increases initially, but decreases in later periods, almost every-
where. Since the use of Basque was historically on a high level, the decrease could be quite pro-
nounced, like in Bermeo, where KEi reached its maximum, 60.35%, in 2006, but then fell to
33.6% in 2016.
The changes in the local data are well captured by our predictive model. For low values of
αi, the PKE(αi) function of 1993, 1997, 2001, 2011 and 2016, do not show significant upward
movements toward the diagonal since the net changes in KEi are very small. But, as mentioned
above, they show that the number of localities with very low αi and KEi have diminished. For
high values of αi, above 50%, the model shows that the curves move toward the diagonal. That
is, if we choose an αi (above 50%), and keep it constant, we see that the corresponding KEi
increases, at different rates, from 1993 to 2011. However, this upward tendency is reversed in
2016. That year’s PKE(αi) curve is below the previous one of 2011, and almost overlapping
with that of 2006 in communities with high αi.
How can we explain the decline in the use of B in areas where bilinguals are historically a
majority of the population and have been using B as a habit? Our model proposes an explana-
tion that hinges mostly on assumption A.3. Bilinguals will be adapted to those high propor-
tions of knowledge and use of B, αi and KEi, that will shape their reference point. Then they
might overestimate, by assuming that they are close to the country’s aspiration, α�, with B
being out of danger. Then, by A.3, m(αi) and c(αi) would be close to their limit values, n and
zero, respectively. That is, bilinguals of those localities would not experience any perceptible
utility benefit from using B, nor any utility loss from, occasionally, being forced to use A. Even
in the presence of cultural identity loyalty, no perceived payoff differences between the two
official languages means low preference intensity for B. This could lead bilinguals to develop
indifference between the A and B languages. A direct consequence of language indifference is
that bilinguals either code-switch frequently (alternating, words and expressions, between the
A and B languages) or speak A more often than B. However, the methodology followed to
gather street use of Basque data does not count conversations displaying code-switching or
words uttered in different languages (see S1 Appendix). The data indicate that for Basque such
a change in the linguistic habits of bilinguals in high α contexts started around the year 2000,
and much earlier for Irish.
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Discussion and conclusion
Many factors outside our model will influence the use of a minority language, such as globali-
zation and international market integration; see [31, 32]. However, we have taken an internal
view, drawing the attention to the bilinguals’ interactive language decisions. Rather than
extending theories of language shift based on models of physical diffusion (either as a Gaussian
function or as a Fourier’s law of heat conduction) explored in [12, 33], our approach proposes
a behavioural game model. This framework allows to establish a functional relation between
minority language shift and bilinguals’ language choices. We show that the diffusion of lan-
guage B replacement, in each locality i at a moment of time, is measured by the empirical spec-
ification of each locality’s ESS equilibrium p�i , and the derived empirical models of predicted
use of B, PKE(αi) and PDU(αi). Hence, our model is able to trace the local changes in language
use.
Looking at the data, one wonders why some bilinguals would behave in a paradoxical way
by shifting to A. Answers based on the prestige (i.e., the perceived status) of the minority lan-
guage B, introduced by [4] and used in almost all the literature rooted in that work, would fail
to understand this issue. As we mentioned above, the bilinguals of the considered societies
wish that B remain as an official language, and, further, have the aspiration of B becoming a
non-endangered language, fighting to minimize the impediments to its use. Similarly, travel-
ling waves and linguistic fronts based on reaction-diffusion models are of little help in this
respect since the bilinguals under consideration are spread all over the country in tight contact
with monolinguals, forming a compact, non-segmented bilingual societies.
The answer given by our model would say: in high αi contexts, bilinguals could develop lan-
guage indifference between A and B, giving rise to conversations plagued with code-switching
between both languages (which could lead to a more intensive use of A, and a progressive
shift). In low αi contexts, the chooser of strategy H minimizes potential frictions because it is
supposed to be polite with monolinguals. But the choice of H reinforces both the linguistic
imperfect information and the use of language A between bilinguals. Thus, in a situation of
language contact with a powerful language A, the combination of language distance and
imperfect linguistic information, could result in a behaviour embedding language indifference
and politeness-led language choices. This, in turn, would lead bilinguals into a dynamics con-
verging into linguistic conventions, as ESS equilibria, with relatively low proportions of R play-
ers. Thus, a mixture of language choice conditions (specified by A.1-A2) and the derived
bilinguals’ choice behaviour act as the driving forces of the dynamics of language B replace-
ment. We dare to say that the bilinguals’ behaviour is guided, as it is common in human lan-
guage, by economizing attitudes ([34]), and the Zipf’s principles of least effort: [28, 35].
The empirical result of this work is that the LUG is a solid model to understand minority
language shift dynamics in the modern, benchmark, bilingual societies studied in the present
work. The model provides knowledge of the formal relations between αi and the predicted use
of B, suggesting policy actions to control the shift process. Essentially, policy makers could
address all the factors of Eq (1) in order to increase p�i (i.e. language B militants) in each locality
i. Further, they could take measures to reduce the imperfect information about linguistic
types. To our knowledge, the imperfect information on linguistic type that obstructs bilinguals
to recognize each other, has been neglected in language economics, [36, 37], sociolinguistics
[38], and by nearly all the mathematical models of language dynamics. Note that outside our
behavioural game framework, the model of [33] can cope with lack of information of a differ-
ent nature. Their Language Inheritance Principle II can estimate the inheritance rate parame-
ter of the competing languages even when there is not sufficient data of speakers’ language
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choices. They predict then language dynamics by means of the Lotka-Volterra equations.
Finally, our model suggests that linguistic politeness behaviour ([39]) is empirically relevant.
We are aware that a model is a simplification and can only explain a part of the observed
dynamics. We considered various modifications, e.g., to allow for non-random matches or
relaxing the assumption of imperfect information. While the prediction models get sometimes
more complex, the empirical findings in the robustness checks did not change.
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